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“DO DEPOSITORS CARE ABOUT ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS?”
ABSTRACT
Since 1990, federal bank supervisors have publicly announced formal enforcement
actions.  This change in regime provides a natural laboratory to test two propositions: (1)
claims by economists that putting confidential supervisory information in the public
domain will enhance market discipline and (2) claims by bank supervisors that releasing
such data will spark runs.  To evaluate these propositions, we measure depositor reaction
to 87 Federal Reserve announcements of enforcement actions.  We compare deposit
growth rates and yield spreads before and after the announcements at the sample banks
and a control group of peer banks.  The data show no evidence of unusual deposit
withdrawals or spread increases at the sample banks following the announcements of
formal actions.  These results suggest that public announcements of enforcement actions
did not spark bank runs or enhance depositor discipline.  Apparently, depositors did not
care a great deal about our sample actions.
JEL Codes: G21 and G28
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I. Introduction
As is well known, underpriced deposit insurance creates incentives for bankers to
take excessive risk.  Bankers can pursue high-risk ventures, confident of capturing the
profits and shifting the losses, should failure occur, to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).  Broadly speaking, two forces constrain this temptation: government
supervision (Flannery, 1982) and discipline by bank claim-holders [see Flannery, (1998)
for a thorough review of the literature].
Theory and evidence suggest that discipline by bank claim-holders can play an
important role constraining bank risk.  Bank claim-holders, with their own money on the
line, have powerful incentives to monitor and punish excessive risk.  Between 1987 and
1991, for example, holders of large certificates of deposit at thrift institutions responded
to increases in the probability of failure by demanding higher yields and withdrawing
funds (Park and Peristiani, 1998).  Thrift supervisors, in contrast, responded to emerging
problems slowly, hoping that troubled institutions would grow out of their problems.
This regulatory forbearance significantly increased the ultimate cost of the cleanup
(Kane, 1989; White, 1991).
The evolution of public policy over the last decade reflects the view that discipline
by bank claim-holders can be an important check on bank risk.  The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) limited insurance coverage
on some classes of deposits and directed the FDIC to resolve failures in the least costly
way.  These provisions shifted more of the burden of failure to uninsured depositors,
thereby strengthening their role as monitors (Benston and Kaufman, 1997).  Moreover,Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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the capital standards phased in under the Basle Accords were designed to mimic the
discipline that depositors would impose in a world with no insurance by linking capital
requirements to credit risk exposure (Berger, et. al., 1995).
In theory, greater disclosure of confidential supervisory information could further
strengthen discipline by bank claim-holders.  The Federal Financial Institutions
Examinations Council (FFIEC) requires all depository institutions to submit quarterly
Reports of Condition and Income, also known as call reports.  Bank claim-holders, in
turn, react when presented with evidence that an institution is taking on more risk (Hall,
Meyer, and Vaughan, 1998; Hall, King, Meyer, and Vaughan, 1999).  Through on-site
examinations, supervisors gather additional information about the quality of loan
portfolios and the competence of bank management that does not appear in call reports.
If bank claim-holders had access to this confidential information, they could, in theory,
exert even more effective discipline on risky institutions.
Bank supervisors have, however, consistently opposed releasing confidential
information for fear of sparking costly runs.  Bank runs, supervisors argue, are not
creatures of the 1930s.  In the 1980s, for example, news reports questioning the solvency
of state-run deposit insurance funds prompted runs at thrift institutions in Maryland and
Ohio (Kane, 1989).  More recently, a CNN report about the 1991 Rhode Island credit
union crisis led to a brief run on Old Stone Bank, a safe and sound $3.7 billion thrift,
when a reporter elected to use the institution’s impressive façade as a backdrop (Wilke,
1991; Leander, 1991). Supervisors fear that depositors will respond to negative
information as Old Stone’s depositors responded to the CNN report.  Instead of
evaluating the information carefully, depositors will panic and withdraw funds fromDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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named or other similar institutions.  The failures of such institutions may, in turn, disrupt
lending relationships that cannot easily be re-established with other banks.  Disruption of
these relationships reduces the value of bank-dependent firms (Peterson and Rajan, 1994;
Slovin, Shuska, and Poloncheck, 1993) and depresses local as well as national economic
activity (Bernanke, 1983; Gilbert and Kochin, 1989).
Although most bank-specific adverse information remains confidential, supervisors
have begun to publicly announce the imposition of formal enforcement actions.
Supervisors use enforcement actions to bring banks into compliance with consumer
regulations and safety-and-soundness standards.  Enforcement actions take one of two
forms: informal understandings between banks and their supervisors and more formal
actions, which are enforceable in the courts.  In 1989, over the objection of the
supervisory community, Congress mandated the disclosure of the most serious formal
actions, cease-and-desist orders.  Soon after, Congress expanded the disclosure
requirements, directing that the public be notified about all formal enforcement actions.
This regime change provides a natural laboratory for gauging depositor response to
adverse supervisory information.
Several studies have explored the impact of enforcement actions on various aspects
of bank behavior.  Curry, et. al. (1999), for example, found that formal enforcement
actions prompt banks to make significant changes in operating policies, such as slowing
asset growth and building loan loss provisions.  Curry (1997) has also presented evidence
showing that formal enforcement actions have the same effect on bank behavior as
informal actions.  Peek and Rosengren (1995a, 1995b, and 1996), meanwhile, haveDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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documented a link between formal enforcement actions and reductions in bank lending,
particularly to bank-dependent borrowers.
Only one study, however, has exploited data on formal actions to address the market
discipline vs. bank run question.  Using an event study approach, Jordan, Peek, and
Rosengren (1999) measured the stock market’s reaction to announcements of formal
actions for a sample of 35 banking organizations.  They identified statistically significant
and economically large, negative abnormal returns on the stock of these organizations
around the time when details of the actions appeared in the press.  To look for evidence
of runs, they also examined deposit levels following the actions and found only a
moderate decline.  The authors interpreted these results as evidence of market discipline
rather than bank runs.
The Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren study suffers from several methodological
shortcomings that make it difficult to interpret their findings.  First, evidence of negative
stock returns following enforcement action announcements is consistent with two
different hypotheses.  On one hand, the capital market could be responding to new
adverse information about the condition of the named institutions.  On the other, the
capital market could be responding to a change in bank control that reduces the value of
the put option implicit in deposit insurance.  The value of this put to bank shareholders
increases with the volatility of underlying cash flows, and supervisors would,
undoubtedly, take steps to reduce volatility.  Second, the authors do not control for
secular trends in deposit growth and for seasonal and geographic deviations from those
trends.  It is possible that deposit levels at other, similar, banks increased dramaticallyDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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over the same time period.  In that case, the moderate declines in deposits at the sample
banks would look more like runs.
We examine the same underlying questions addressed in the Jordan, Peek, and
Rosengren study, but we use an approach that allows clearer interpretation of the
evidence.  Specifically, we measure depositor reaction to 87 Federal Reserve
announcements of enforcement actions.  We compare deposit growth rates before and
after the announcements at the sample banks and a control group of peer banks.  We also
track changes in the spread between deposit yields offered by the sample banks and the
peer banks.  Unlike previous work, our method controls for seasonal, geographic, and
secular influences.  Moreover, we exploit heterogeneity in the sample to gauge the
importance of change-in-control effects to our results.
Taken together, our findings suggest that public announcements of formal actions
did not spark bank runs or enhance depositor discipline.  The data showed no evidence of
unusual deposit withdrawals from the sample banks or unusual increases in deposit
spreads after the disclosures.  Apparently, depositors did not care a great deal about our
sample actions.
II. A Primer on Enforcement Actions
The announcement that a supervisor has imposed a formal action signals depositors
that serious regulatory compliance or safety-and-soundness issues exist at the affected
institution.  If the action concerns a safety-and-soundness issue, then depositors may
revise upward their expected probability of institution failure.  For the same potentialDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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losses—either the principal on uninsured deposits or the nuisance cost of having
transactions funds in a closed institution—such a revision implies an increase in the
expected losses.  In theory, depositors should respond by withdrawing funds or
demanding higher returns on those funds.  If depositors panic, a run could occur.
To see why depositors might value the signal from an enforcement action, it is
necessary to understand the role of these actions in bank supervision.  The term
“enforcement action” refers to a broad range of powers used to address suspect practices
of depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties.  Typically, enforcement
actions are imposed after an on-site exam has unearthed adverse information, but they
can also be triggered by deficient capital levels under the prompt corrective action
guidelines of FDICIA or by information gathered through off-site surveillance.
Supervisors generally implement enforcement actions in a graduated manner, with
informal actions preceding formal actions.
Informal actions are the most common type of enforcement action.  Supervisors use
informal actions when problems are considered to be less severe and management is
expected to take corrective steps.  Informal actions are simply mutual understandings
between banks and their supervisors that suspect practices and violations will be
addressed.  These understandings are not enforceable through the courts; failure to
comply cannot serve as a basis for assessing civil money penalties, for initiating actions
to remove bank officers or directors, or for prohibiting bank officers or directors from
involvement in the affairs of other banks.  Supervisors do not disclose informal actions to
the public.  Table 1 contains data on enforcement actions issued by the Federal Reserve.
From 1990 through 1997, the Federal Reserve imposed 1,611 enforcement actionsDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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against bank holding companies and state-chartered, member banks. Of that total, 1,346
(84 percent) were informal.
Supervisors resort to formal actions only when violations of law or regulations
continue or when unsafe and abusive practices occur.  Formal enforcement actions are
legally enforceable and, in most cases, publicly disclosed.  Formal actions include cease-
and-desist orders, written agreements, prohibition-and-removal orders, civil money
penalties, and prompt-corrective-action directives.  Written agreements and cease-and-
desist orders are the most common types of formal action.  Of the 265 final, formal
enforcement actions announced by the Federal Reserve though 1997, 180 (or 68 percent)
were written agreements, while 68 (or 26 percent) were cease-and-desist orders.
Although supervisors view all formal actions as grave matters, they consider cease-
and-desist orders to be more serious than written agreements.  Supervisors rely on written
agreements when they believe that an institution’s problems warrant a less severe form of
formal action and that management will take remedial steps.  A cease-and-desist order, in
contrast, is used as a last resort.  Such an order requires a depository institution or person
either to desist from suspect practices or violations or to take affirmative action to correct
the practices or violations.  An affirmative action could, for example, require that the
institution be returned to its condition prior to the practice or violation.  Other affirmative
actions include restrictions on growth, debt and dividends; disposition of certain loans or
assets; rescission of agreements or contracts; and the termination of certain officers or
employees.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Prior to 1989, the public never learned about the vast majority of enforcement
actions.  The Securities and Exchange Commission did require depository institutions
with publicly traded stock to disclose enforcement actions deemed “material.”  In
addition, the Comptroller of the Currency—on a limited, case-by-case basis—disclosed
the facts surrounding its enforcement actions (Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct
in the Nation’s Financial Institutions, p. 88).  FIRREA and the Crime Control Act (CCA)
of 1990 required supervisory agencies for the first time to publicly disclose final, formal
enforcement actions as well as any modifications or terminations of the actions.
In the debate over FIRREA, the House of Representatives questioned the secrecy
about enforcement actions, noting that bank supervisors were alone among federal
regulators in keeping civil enforcement actions confidential (Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, p. 470).  The House also asserted that
confidentiality served only to perpetuate banker misconduct and exacerbate the problems
of troubled institutions.  Disclosure, in contrast, would inform taxpayers about the
effectiveness of the bank regulatory system, signal depository institutions about the types
of conduct that would not be tolerated, and warn the financial community about particular
problem banks (Combating Fraud, p. 89).  Supervisors countered that disclosure of
enforcement actions might trigger bank runs, but these concerns were downplayed.
Indeed, the House noted that no bank or thrift run had ever occurred following the
indictment and prosecution of a bank official or owner (Ibid., p. 89).Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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III. The Sample Enforcement Actions
To test depositor reaction to enforcement action announcements, we assembled a
sample of publicly disclosed actions from the 1990s.  We began by securing press notices
for all formal actions imposed by the three federal banking agencies since 1990.  After
reading these notices, we decided to limit the sample to actions brought by the Federal
Reserve for safety-and-soundness reasons.  We excluded actions dealing with consumer
affairs problems because they revealed no adverse information about bank condition.  We
confined our analysis to Federal Reserve actions to allow clearer identification of an
event date.  The Fed announced each action in a separate press release at the time of
imposition while the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC announced all actions in
monthly press releases.  Concentrating on Federal Reserve actions also insured greater
homogeneity in the sample; discussions with Federal Reserve supervisors and lawyers
convinced us that fewer differences obtain across the twelve regional Reserve Banks than
across federal supervisory agencies in the criteria for resorting to a formal action.
We designed our sample to bias the empirical tests towards finding evidence of a
depositor reaction.  The sample included only those formal actions that were clearly
related to bank condition and, hence, would be interpreted by depositors as “bad news.”
The text of the sample press releases included common provisions such as prohibitions
on paying dividends.  Applying this screen yielded a sample of 177 formal enforcement
actions imposed on 166 different banks.  Unfortunately, weekly deposit data were not
available for 69 of these banks.  Also, we could not find adequate peer institutions for 9
banks.  (We matched each sample bank with a set of peer banks to hold all other factors
affecting deposit behavior constant.  See section IV for further discussion.)  Finally, weDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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deleted one bank as an outlier.  After these adjustments, the sample included 87
enforcement actions on 87 different banks.
Although the sample was not chosen to be representative, it matched the universe of
U.S. banks and Federal Reserve enforcement actions reasonably well.  Table 2 presents
information about the 87 sample banks and the enforcement actions imposed on those
banks.  The sample banks were geographically dispersed, representing 25 states and each
of the nine U.S. census regions except the Pacific Northwest.  The sample banks, like
most U.S. banks, were small—65 of the 87 actions were imposed on banks with less than
$250 million in assets.  The sample actions, like most of the enforcement actions in the
1990s, were concentrated in the first part of the decade; 81 of the 87 actions were
imposed before 1995.  Finally, like most formal actions in the 1990s, most of the sample
actions were written agreements (60), but a nontrivial number were cease-and-desist
orders (27).
When analyzing the impact of enforcement action announcements on deposit
behavior, it is important to distinguish between changes induced by depositors and
changes induced by supervisors.  Supervisors assign confidential safety-and-soundness
grades at the close of each examination.  These grades, called composite CAMELS
scores, range from 1 (best) to 5 (worst).  In general, banks with composite ratings of
CAMELS 3, 4, or, 5 are considered problem institutions.  When a bank slips into problem
status, supervisors typically require management to develop an explicit plan for restoring
safety and soundness.  These plans often involve strengthening the bank’s leverage ratio.
Because troubled institutions often find it difficult to attract new capital, executing these
plans depends heavily on reducing assets and deposits (Gilbert, 1994; Curry, et. al.,Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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1999).  If formal actions were imposed at the same time a bank was downgraded to
problem status, then any observed change in deposit behavior in the following weeks or
quarters might be the result of management action rather than depositor reaction.
For most of the sample banks, a considerable span of time separated the enforcement
action and CAMEL downgrades, making it more likely that any observed changes in
deposit behavior were induced by depositors.
1  We defined a downgrade date as the
opening date of the examination that ultimately led to the increase in (deterioration of)
the composite CAMEL rating.  Table 3 classifies the 87 sample banks by the time elapsed
between the downgrade to problem status and the formal action.  Supervisors
downgraded 80 of the sample banks at least one quarter before the date of the action.  For
75 of the sample banks, the interval between the CAMEL downgrade and the
announcement date was at least two quarters.  For 57 of the banks, at least a year
separated the downgrade and the enforcement action.  In short, supervisors recognized
problems and demanded remedial action at most of the sample banks well before the
enforcement actions were imposed.
Because, in theory, a formal action will prompt a depositor reaction only if the
announcement changes perceptions about failure, it is important to identify the
information available to the public as of the announcement date.  If, for example, the
sample banks already had one foot in the grave, the announcements might not have
conveyed much additional information to depositors.  Table 4 summarizes the data
available to the public about the capital positions, profitability, and asset quality of the
                                                
1  The “S” component of the CAMELS score, which gauges sensitivity to market risk, was not added
until January 1, 1997—at the end of our sample period.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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sample banks in the quarter prior to the actions.  Most of the banks were adequately
capitalized: about two-thirds boasted equity-to-asset ratios above 6 percent.  Although the
sample banks posted relatively low profitability ratios—only 16 met the industry
benchmark of a one-percent return on assets—net income was positive at 47 of the banks.
Asset quality was a problem at many of the banks; nevertheless, 52 of the 87 banks
reported nonperforming-loan-to-asset ratios below the 4 percent threshold documented by
Gilbert (1992) as a harbinger of failure.  In short, the sample banks were not, on average,
in robust condition, but they were not on the verge of failure either.
IV. The Research Strategy
To examine the run vs. market discipline question, we looked for evidence that
depositors withdrew funds or demanded higher yields from the sample banks following
disclosure of the formal actions. If depositors receive unfavorable signals from
supervisory enforcement actions, they ought to respond to them by decreasing the supply
of funds they provide to the afflicted bank.  This deposit-supply contraction should lead,
ceteris paribus, to a decrease in deposit accounts on the bank’s books and a rise in the
yield it is obliged to pay on these accounts.
One can imagine an alternative scenario wherein the bank’s demand for deposits
shifts synchronously with depositor supply.  This reaction may occur, for example, if
borrowers interpret the enforcement action as a signal that the bank has loose credit
standards and flood it with increased loan demand.  The bank will then attempt to attract
additional deposits to fund the new loans, so that observations of changes in deposit totals
may understate the effects of the depositor reaction.  In the extreme, we may actually seeDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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deposit levels rise in the aftermath of the enforcement action if this demand on the part of
the bank greatly outweighs the supply contraction.  Looking only at changes in deposit
quantities may thus be misleading if supply does not move in isolation.  However, the
demand and supply movements in this scenario will both exert an upward effect on
yields.  By looking at changes in both deposit levels and yields (i.e., both at price and
quantity fluctuations), we can deduce unambiguously whether any depositor reaction has
occurred.
We therefore looked both at changes in growth rates and yields for total deposits at
our sample banks.  We also considered four specific types of deposits—transactions
deposits, savings deposits, small time deposits, and large time deposits.  A priori, we
expected that large time deposits would be the most sensitive to announcements because,
in the wake of FDICIA, large depositors have borne more of the burden of failures.
We began by computing deposit growth rates for the sample banks in the weeks and
quarters following the announcements.  We let D
s represent the weekly deposit level in
the sample banks and the subscripts on D
s  denote the week of the observation.  For
example, D
s
0 refers to the deposit level in the sample banks the week just prior to the
announcement.  Similarly, D
s
n  refers to deposit levels “n” weeks or quarters later.  Using
this nomenclature, we calculated deposit growth for the sample banks in the “n” weeks or
quarters after the enforcement action using the following ratio:
    
D
D




Deposit growth at the sample banks in the “n” weeks
after the announcementDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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When examining deposit growth, it is important to control for seasonal and
geographic influences.  Suppose, for example, that deposits declined at the sample banks
an average of 10 percent in the four weeks after the enforcement action.  If deposits also
declined 10 percent at a set of peer banks over that same period, it would be hard to
conclude that depositors of the sample banks reacted to the announcement.  To control
for geographic and seasonal factors, we subtracted the deposit growth rate at a set of peer
banks in the “n” weeks or quarters after the announcement from the deposit growth rate
at the sample banks.  Letting D
p
n denote deposit levels in the peer banks “n” weeks or
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We formed the control group by matching each sample bank with at least three and
as many as ten peer institutions.  Peer banks had to be headquartered in the same census
“Adjusted” deposit
growth at the
sample banks in the
“n” weeks after the
announcement
Deposit growth at the peer banks in the “n” weeks after
the announcementDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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region, boast a CAMEL 1 or 2 rating, and maintain total deposit levels within 25 percent
of the sample bank as of the date of the enforcement action.  To eliminate noise, we
treated peer banks collectively as one big bank.  To insure robustness, we assembled an
alternative peer group by matching each sample bank with a healthy (CAMEL 1 or 2
rating), similarly sized institution (total deposit levels within 10 percent of the sample
bank) that was located outside of the census region of the sample bank.  In the alternative
group, each sample bank was matched with at least 5 and as many as 613 peer banks.
It is also important to control for underlying trends in deposit growth at the sample
and peer banks.  A negative adjusted deposit growth figure might, instead of providing
evidence of depositor reaction to an enforcement action, be nothing more than the
continuation of a trend.  Suppose, for example, that the public is aware of a general
deterioration in the condition of the sample banks.  As a result, adjusted deposits—
growth at the sample banks net of growth at the peer banks—have declined an average of
10 percent in each of the past three quarters.  If adjusted deposits declined 10 percent in
the quarter following the enforcement action, it would be hard to conclude that depositors
of the sample banks found the announcements alarming.
To control for secular trends, we subtracted adjusted deposit growth in the “n” weeks
or quarters before the announcement from the adjusted growth rate of deposits in the “n”
weeks or quarters after the announcement.  We used the same approach to obtain deposit
growth figures in the period leading up to the announcement that we used to obtain
growth figures for the period following the announcement.  Specifically, we let D
s
-n
denote the deposit levels in the sample bank “n” weeks or quarters before the
announcement and D
p
-n denote the deposit levels in the peer banks “n” weeks or quartersDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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before the announcement.  To obtain adjusted growth before the announcement, we

















Finally, to arrive at an overall figure for deposit growth that controlled for seasonal and
geographic influences as well as secular trends, we subtracted adjusted deposit growth
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Rearranging parentheses highlights the amount of the overall change that can be traced to











  -  
D
D
  -    
D
D








































actionDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
19
We examined changes in adjusted deposit growth rates over three intervals: four
weeks before to four weeks after the announcement, one quarter before to one quarter
after the announcement, and two quarters before to two quarters after the announcement.
Weekly deposit data were obtained from each bank’s Report of Transaction Accounts,
Other Deposits and Vault Cash (reported on the Federal Reserve form, FR 2900).  An
economically and statistically significant decline in adjusted deposit growth following the
announcement would be evidence that depositors reacted adversely to the enforcement
action.  Although no clear line differentiates a run from depositor discipline, we believe
that exceptionally large declines during the four-week window are consistent with runs
while large declines during the one-quarter and/or two-quarter windows are more
consistent with depositor discipline.
Because depositor discipline can also take the form of higher deposit rates, we
analyzed trends in funding costs at the sample banks.  Indeed, Park and Peristiani (1998)
have shown that market discipline is reflected entirely in rates when every depositor can
accurately estimate the probability of failure and the expected amount to be recovered
should failure occur.  Changes in market rates were not observable for most of the sample
banks, so we examined changes in accounting proxies for market rates.  We used call
report data to compute the average rates paid on deposits each quarter by the sample
banks and their peers.  Specifically, these yields were calculated by dividing the interest
paid on deposits in a given quarter by the average level of deposits in that quarter.
Following our work on deposit growth, we calculated yields for total deposits as well as
for transaction deposits, savings deposits, small time deposits and large time deposits.
We also included a yield measure that adjusted for service charges (NETYLD) becauseDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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the explicit interest on some accounts may be offset by various fees.  In sum, the six yield
measures were:
•   GROSYLD – the average yield on all deposits (not adjusting for deposit
charges)
•   JUMYLD – the average yield on jumbo (> $100,000) time deposits
•   SMALYLD – the average yield on time deposits under $100,000
•   TRANYLD – the average yield on transactions deposits
•   SAVYLD – the average yield on savings deposits
•   NETYLD – the average yield on all deposits, net of deposit charges
When analyzing trends in deposit yields, it is important to control for seasonal and
geographic influences as well as the general level of interest rates.  We controlled for
these influences by computing the spread between the yields offered by the sample banks
and the yields offered by the control banks.  We then examined the change in these yields
between the announcement date and a date “n” quarters later.  Specifically, for total
deposits as well as for each individual deposit category, we let Y
s
n refer to the yield
offered by the sample banks “n” quarters after the action, and Y
p
n refer to the yield
offered by the peer banks.  The spread for each deposit category “n” quarters after the
announcement is given by:
Similarly, the spread at the time of the enforcement action is given by:
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For each deposit category, the change in spread in the “n” quarters after the enforcement
action is given by:
We controlled for secular trends by comparing the changes in deposit spreads in the
“n” quarters after the enforcement action with changes in the “n” quarters before the
action.  Following the approach we used to calculate changes after the announcement, we
computed changes in the spread for each deposit category in the “n” quarters before the
action:
The change in the trend in the spread is, therefore, given by:
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Again, we can rearrange the terms in equation (2) to highlight the amount of the widening
(or narrowing) in spreads that can be traced to the sample banks and the amount that can
be traced to the peer banks.
We tracked changes in deposit spreads over two intervals: one quarter before to one
quarter after the announcement, and two quarters before to two quarters after the
announcement.  We obtained the interest expense data from schedule RI and the deposit
level data from schedule RC-E of each bank’s call report.  We could not consider the
four-week interval because call report data are only submitted quarterly.  Evidence that
deposit spreads widened by more—in a statistically as well as economically meaningful
sense—in the one- and two-quarter intervals following the announcement than in the
quarters before the announcement would be consistent with depositor discipline.
V. Evidence of Bank Runs
As noted, supervisors opposed announcing the imposition of formal actions on the
grounds that such announcements might spark runs.  We now test this claim by
examining changes in adjusted deposits in the four weeks following disclosure.
Specifically, we define a run as an exceptionally large decline in adjusted deposits at the
sample banks in the four weeks after the announcement, compared with the four weeks
before the announcement.  Table 5 contains the evidence about runs on the sample banks.
Panel A displays the adjusted growth figures for the sample banks and the original peer
group.  Panel B shows the adjusted growth figures when the alternative peer group is
used for control.  Panel C documents the adjusted growth rates for the sample banksDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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following their last CAMEL downgrade.  These growth rates provide a benchmark for
interpreting the economic significance of adjusted growth rates in Panels A and B.  A
run, for example, should involve deposit runoffs several orders of magnitude larger than
the runoffs engineered by bank management to comply with supervisory directives. In
each panel, column 3 contains the overall change in deposit growth (change at the sample
banks minus change at the peer banks); column 4 contains the standard deviation of the
overall change, column 5 notes the statistical significance of the overall change; and
column 6 indicates what percentage of the sample banks experienced deposit runoffs
relative to their peers.
Adjusted deposit growth in the four-week interval after the formal actions suggests
that the announcements did not spark runs.  The average change in total deposits was a
positive 0.49 percent, implying that funds flowed into the sample banks relative to peer
banks, though this change was not statistically significant.  Moreover, only 46 percent of
the sample banks experienced a relative outflow of total deposits.  Turning to the
individual deposit categories, on average the sample banks did suffer small relative
runoffs of savings deposits and jumbo CDs, although, again, neither change was
statistically significant.  The results were comparable when an alternative peer group was
used.  As expected, jumbo CDs exhibited the most sensitivity to the announcement (a
2.88 percent adjusted decline using the original peer group and a 2.48 percent adjusted
decline with the alternative peer group).  Still, the adjusted decline was not appreciably
larger than the runoff that occurred after the last CAMEL downgrade (-2.83%).
One potential reason that depositors did not “run” the sample banks is that they
already knew about the safety-and-soundness problems.  To explore this possibility, weDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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partitioned the 87 sample banks into two sub-samples: those that appeared financially
strong and those that appeared financially weak as of the last call report.   A “strong”
bank had to meet three criteria: an equity-to-asset ratio above 6 percent, a return-on-asset
ratio above zero, and a nonperforming-loan-to-asset ratio below 4 percent.  Of the 87
sample banks, 28 met the criteria.  Depositors at the strong banks should have been
surprised by the enforcement action announcements.  It is possible, therefore, that runs on
the strong banks occurred, but that the evidence is obscured by the inclusion of the 59
other banks.
Examination of deposit growth rates at the strong banks offered no evidence of runs.
Comparisons of adjusted deposit growth at these banks and the 59 other banks—for total
deposits as well as for the individual deposit categories—revealed no statistically
significant differences.  Looking at the strong bank sub-sample in isolation, the average
change in total deposits was small (0.21 percent), had the wrong sign and was not
statistically significant.  Again, runoffs of total deposits occurred at only about one-half
of the strong banks.  Turning to the individual deposit categories, the 28 strong banks
again suffered small relative runoffs of savings deposits and jumbo CDs, although, as
with the full sample, neither change was statistically significant.  The adjusted decline in
jumbo CDs was somewhat larger (-4.13 percent) than the average runoff for the full
sample (-2.88 percent) but still not large enough to be characterized as a run.  These
results did not change when the alternative peer group was used for control.
Another possible explanation for the evidence is that depositors at the larger sample
banks believed that their funds carried de facto insurance.  Depositors at banks deemed
“too big to fail” might not infer from the announcement of a formal action that expectedDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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losses were higher.  To control for this effect, we partitioned the 87-bank sample into two
sub-samples: the 79 banks with less than $1 billion in deposits at the time of the
enforcement actions (“small” banks) and the 8 banks with more than $1 billion in
deposits (“too big to fail” banks).  We then examined the adjusted deposit growth rates
for the small bank sub-sample and compared them with the growth rates for the “too big
to fail” sub-sample.
The data did not support the hypothesis that small and large banks posted different
deposit growth rates in the wake of the enforcement actions.  First, the results for the
small bank sub-sample were almost identical to those obtained with the full sample.
Irrespective of which control group we used, the adjusted growth of total deposits was
small (0.27 percent for the original peer group and 0.33 percent for the alternative peer
group), positive, and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Again, only two of the
individual deposit growth rates had the correct sign: savings deposits and jumbo CDs
(though neither differed statistically from zero).  And, the decline in jumbo CDs (-2.56
percent with original peers) was on par with the decline for the full sample.  Second, and
more important, we could not reject the hypothesis that adjusted deposit growth rates for
the small and the “too big to fail” banks were equal, not only for total deposits, but also
for each deposit category.
Still another possible explanation for the absence of runs is that depositors did not
know about the sample actions.  The Fed issued press releases about the actions, but it is
possible that local, regional, or trade newspapers did not report them.  To exclude this
possibility, we searched several news databases for articles about each bank or its holding
company, beginning two months before the announcement of the formal action andDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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ending two months after the announcement.  The databases included articles from 127
major regional newspapers and business publications as well as The New York Times, The
Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor and American Banker.  The search
revealed articles about 33 of the 87 sample actions.  Because it is possible that runs
occurred only at the banks whose actions were reported, we analyzed adjusted deposit
growth rates for the 33 “cited” banks and compared the growth figures with the averages
for the remaining sample banks.
The data revealed no evidence of runs on the banks whose enforcement actions were
reported in the press.  As in all the other cases, the adjusted growth of total deposits at the
cited banks was small (0.20 percent), positive, and statistically insignificant.  As before,
only about one-half of the “cited” banks suffered a runoff.  Again, the growth rates for
only two individual deposit categories (savings and large time) had the correct sign—
though neither differed statistically from zero.  Again, jumbo CDs were the most
responsive deposit category (a 3.10 percent drop), yet the decline was still not large
enough to suggest a run.  Again, all of these results remained intact when we employed a
different peer definition group.  Finally, tests on differences of means could not rule out
the possibility that the cited and non-cited banks had the same adjusted growth rates for
total deposits, as well as for each individual deposit category.
One final possible explanation for the results is that a “change-in-control” effect
offset the “depositor-run” effect.  The announcement of a formal action reveals two
pieces of information.  First, the announcement reveals that serious safety-and-soundness
problems exist at the bank.  Depositors should greet this news with concern; it implies
that failure is more likely.  If sufficiently concerned about bank viability, depositorsDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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might panic and run the bank.  Second, the announcement reveals that a change in control
has occurred; some portion of effective control has passed from the management team to
bank supervisors.  Depositors should welcome this news; it implies that a failure is less
likely.  In this case, depositors will be less apt to remove funds from the bank.  It is
possible that the change-in-control effect offsets the depositor-run effect, resulting in no
observable change in adjusted deposit growth.
One way to measure the size of the change-in-control effect is to examine depositor
responses to announcements at the subset of sample banks whose problems were well
known.  An enforcement action announcement should release little additional negative
information about these institutions.  Any observed changes in adjusted deposit growth
rates should reflect only the change-in-control effect.  Earlier we characterized a sample
bank as “strong” if it boasted a return-on-asset ratio above zero, a nonperforming-loan-to-
asset ratio below four percent, and an equity-to-asset ratio above six percent as of its
latest call report.  Conversely, we now characterize a sample bank as “known to be weak”
if it failed all three performance criteria.  Eleven banks failed all three performance tests.
Economically large and statistically significant deposit inflows into the weak banks
would suggest that the change-in-control effect is potentially important and should not be
neglected when interpreting adjusted deposit growth rates.
Evidence from the weak bank sub-sample did not support the conjecture that a large
change in control effect explains the absence of runs.  Irrespective of the peer group
employed, adjusted deposit growth for the weak banks was not economically large or
statistically significant.  Indeed, the growth figures for the weak banks (0.83 percent)
looked very much like the averages for the 87-bank sample as well as the averages for theDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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strong bank sub-sample (i.e., the subset of banks that passed all three performance tests).
Moreover, formal tests revealed no significant differences between the adjusted growth
rates at the 11 weak banks and 76 remaining banks, or between the 11 weak banks and
the 33 strong banks.  These patterns remained even when the definition of weak was
expanded to include banks that failed two of three performance tests (thereby expanding
the sub-sample from 11 to 32 banks).
In short, the evidence provided no support for claims by bank supervisors that
disclosure of formal actions would trigger bank runs.  Irrespective of the sub-sample or
the peer group definition employed, the data showed no economically large or
statistically significant deposit runoffs following announcements.  Moreover, attempts to
measure depositor reaction to changes in bank control suggest that offsetting change-in-
control and safety-and-soundness effects do not account for the results.
VI. Evidence of Depositor Discipline
As noted, economists generally believe that confidential supervisory data should be
put in the public domain on the grounds that the market will use this information to
discipline risky institutions.  We now test this claim for announcements of formal actions
by examining changes in adjusted deposit growth and spreads over longer time horizons.
Specifically, we define depositor discipline as economically significant declines in
adjusted deposits at the sample banks and/or economically significant widening of
adjusted deposit spreads in the quarters following the announcements.  Tables 6 and 7
contain the deposit growth evidence. Tables 8 and 9 contain the spread evidence.  AsDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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before, Panel A in each table displays the figures for the sample banks using the original
peer group to hold every other influence constant.  Panel B shows the figures with the
alternative peer group used for control.  Panel C documents the adjusted changes for the
sample banks following their last CAMEL downgrade.  In each panel, column 3 contains
the overall change in deposit spreads (change at the sample banks minus change at the
peer banks); column 4 contains the standard deviation of the overall change, column 5
notes the statistical significance of the overall change; and column 6 indicates what
percentage of the sample banks saw their adjusted spreads widen relative to their peers.
The deposit growth data for the one-quarter interval did not show evidence of
depositor discipline.  On average, adjusted total deposits at the sample banks actually
grew 0.51 percent, though this figure was statistically insignificant.  Furthermore, only
about one-half of the sample banks experienced runoffs in total deposits.  For the
individual deposit categories, only the changes for transactions deposits (-0.74 percent)
and large time deposits (-2.02 percent) had the correct sign, though again neither was
statistically significant.  The results with the alternative peer group were similar, though
the breakout by individual categories showed a sign reversal on the change in large time
deposits (now 1.12 percent, but still not significant).  To put these figures in context, the
sample banks experienced large (-6.99 percent), statistically significant (5 percent level)
declines in jumbo CDs following their last CAMEL downgrades.
Evidence from the two-quarter interval did not support the depositor discipline
hypothesis either.  Adjusted total deposits at the sample banks did decline, but the figure
was quite small (0.10 percent) and statistically insignificant.  Again, only about one-half
of the sample banks experienced runoffs in total deposits.  For three of the four individualDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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categories—transactions deposits (-3.27 percent), savings deposits (-3.64 percent), and
large time deposits (-6.52 percent)—changes in adjusted deposits had the correct sign.  In
addition, runoffs in these categories were larger than those observed over the one-quarter
interval.  Still, none of the changes differed statistically from zero.  Moreover, the rather
large runoff in jumbo CDs dropped significantly (to –1.61 percent) when the alternative
peer group was employed as a control.  Again to put the large time deposit figures in
context, the sample banks suffered much larger (-12.87 percent), statistically significant
(one percent level) runoffs in the wake of their last CAMEL downgrades.
To insure robustness, adjusted deposit growth rates were examined for the same sub-
samples that we used in the bank run analysis.  These sub-samples included the banks
with less than $1 billion in deposits, the banks with strong performance ratios as of their
last call report submissions, the banks whose enforcement actions were reported in the
press, and the banks with weak performance ratios as of their latest call reports.  The
results conformed to those obtained with the full sample.  In short, we unearthed no
evidence of market discipline from the deposit growth data.
Turning to spreads, the data for the one-quarter interval did not show evidence of
depositor discipline.  As noted, large, statistically significant increases in adjusted spreads
following the announcements would be consistent with such discipline.  On average,
however, adjusted gross spreads narrowed 1 basis point in the quarter after disclosure,
though this dip was not statistically significant.  Net spreads were unchanged.  Only
about one-half of the sample banks saw their gross or net adjusted spreads widen after the
actions.  Interestingly, jumbo CD spreads, which, in theory, should be the most likely to
widen after the actions, were entirely responsible for the overall decline in gross spreads.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Indeed, adjusted jumbo-CD spreads narrowed 27 basis points when the original peer
group was used as a control and 21 basis points when the alternative peer group was
employed.  Neither of these changes, however, was statistically significant.  To put all of
these spread results in context, adjusted spreads on jumbo CDs widened 62 basis points
and adjusted gross spreads widened 37 basis points following the last CAMEL
downgrades.
Changes in adjusted spreads over the two-quarter interval did not show evidence of
depositor discipline either.  Indeed, adjusted spreads for each of the individual deposit
categories narrowed in the six months after the enforcement actions.  The decline in
spreads on jumbo certificates of deposit (CDs) was the largest (40 basis points), proving
significant at the 5 percent level.  The dips in adjusted gross spreads (23 basis points) and
adjusted net spreads (26 basis points) also proved statistically significant.  Only about
one-third of the sample banks saw their adjusted gross or net spreads widen after the
actions.  Using the alternative peer group yielded similar results, though the declines in
spreads were only about half as large.  In contrast to these figures, adjusted gross spreads
widened by 28 basis points in the six months following a CAMEL downgrade.
Again, to insure robustness, we examined changes in adjusted spreads for the various
sub-samples used in the deposit growth analysis.  These sub-samples included the banks
with less than $1 billion in deposits, the banks with strong performance ratios as of their
last call report submissions, the banks whose enforcement actions were reported in the
press, and the banks with weak performance ratios as of their latest call reports.  The
results confirmed those obtained with the full sample.  In short, we could find no
evidence of depositor discipline in the deposit-spread data.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Because tests on changes in average yields have low power to detect changes in the
marginal cost of deposits, we examined changes in spreads for one additional sub-
sample—the banks with short average CD maturities.  As noted by James (1988), banks
holding deposits with longer average maturities roll over their portfolios less often.
Consequently, the average yield on their deposits takes longer to adjust to new
information.  For this reason, we identified the subset of our sample with average jumbo
CD maturities of less than six months; 24 banks met this criterion.  The average
maturities of the jumbo-CD portfolios at the original and alternative peer banks did not
match the average maturities of the jumbo-CD portfolios at the 24 “short maturity”
banks, so we controlled for seasonal and macroeconomic influences by identifying a new
set of peer banks.  This new set of peers included all U.S. banks with CAMEL 1 or 2
ratings, with weighted-average CD maturities under six months, with average assets of at
least $25 million but no more than $2.5 billion (the asset range for the short maturity sub-
sample), and with jumbo-CD holdings of at least $2.5 million but not more than $200
million (the range of jumbo-CD portfolio sizes for the short maturity sub-sample).  The
number of new peer banks varied from 1,063 to 6,630, depending on the quarter.
The short maturity sub-sample did not offer any evidence of depositor discipline.
Indeed, in the quarter following the actions, adjusted jumbo-CD spreads narrowed, on
average, by 40 additional basis points, though this change was not statistically significant.
Moreover, only 30 percent of the sub-sample experienced any widening in jumbo-CD
spreads.  Over the two-quarter interval, adjusted spreads narrowed by even more—58
basis points, a decline that proved significant at the 5 percent level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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VII. Discussion
The evidence offered no support for the fear that announcements of formal actions
lead to bank runs.  At the same time, the evidence also did not support the view that such
announcements strengthen depositor discipline.  Indeed, taken together, the evidence
suggests that depositors did not care much about our sample actions.  Figure 1 provides a
visual summary of our results.  It shows ordered pairs of changes in deposit growth and
deposit spreads for the individual sample banks in the two-quarter interval following the
announcements.  Depositor discipline involves a relative decrease in the supply of
deposits to the sample banks.  Such a decrease would engender a decline in adjusted
deposit growth and a widening of adjusted deposit spreads.  In the figure, a cluster of
points in quadrant II would be consistent with depositor discipline.  Note that the
observations are not clustered in quadrant II.  Rather, most observations are clustered
around the origin.
Although poor test design may account for some of our results, we are not inclined
to dismiss them entirely.  True, the tests were structured like event studies, yet the deposit
series and interest expense series were much lower frequency than typical event study
data.  It is possible that other contaminating events offset depositor responses to the
sample actions, particularly over the one- and two-quarter intervals.  Still, the results
were robust to a variety of sample cuts and peer-group definitions.  Another potential
criticism is that the relatively small sample sizes gave the tests low power.  Even so,
some changes in deposit growth and deposit spreads were significant.  More importantly,
even if one assumed infinitesimal standard deviations so that every change in growth
rates and spreads was significant, the small magnitudes relative to those observed afterDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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CAMEL downgrades still suggest that depositors cared little about the sample
announcements.
One possible reason for the apparent indifference of insured depositors is that the
increase in expected losses due to the announcement was less than the transactions costs
and interest penalties associated with moving deposits.  The cost of failure to depositors
holding less than $100,000 is merely the inconvenience of delayed access to funds.
These depositors may have perceived an increase in the probability of failure due to the
action but did not withdraw their funds or demand higher interest rates because they
considered the expected losses to be trivial.
Although the seeming indifference of uninsured depositors is more puzzling, we can
think of three potential explanations.  Perhaps large depositors were unable to extract a
useful signal about bank condition from the press releases.  The Federal Reserve
announced the sample actions through short statements with no accompanying
explanation.  Moreover, the Fed refused, as a matter of policy, to answer questions about
the actions.  Another possibility is that uninsured depositors were slow to recognize that
their funds were no longer protected from a failure.  Most of the sample actions were
concentrated in the early 1990s.  In their study of subordinated debt yields, Flannery and
Sorescu (1996) noted that sensitivity to bank risk increased gradually in the early 1990s
as the government retreated from “too big to fail” guarantees and FDICIA shifted more of
the burden of failure to uninsured claim-holders.  One final potential explanation is that
banking conditions improved so rapidly over the sample period that large depositors
attached little importance to enforcement action announcements.  In 1990, 159 banks
failed in the U.S.; by 1997, this number had dropped to one.  In such a robust bankingDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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environment, news about formal actions may not have prompted uninsured depositors to
reconsider their estimates of bank failure.
VIII. Conclusion
We examined depositor responses to public announcements of formal enforcement
actions.  The evidence suggests that banks under formal enforcement actions in the 1990s
did not suffer deposit runoffs or significant increases in deposit costs.  Indeed, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that depositors did not care about the sample actions.
Our findings do not, however, imply that supervisors should discontinue the
announcements.  Rapidly improving banking conditions and a rapidly declining number
of bank failures characterized our sample period.  Depositors might find information
about formal actions useful in a banking environment more like that of the 1980s.  More
importantly, depositors might find news about formal actions useful, irrespective of the
condition of the banking sector, if the press releases contained more contextual
information.
Our research does have implications for the debate over publicizing CAMELS
scores.  As noted, supervisors have historically opposed the release of any adverse
information gathered through examinations for fear of sparking costly runs.  Our
evidence demonstrates that the fears expressed by supervisors during the debate over
disclosing formal actions were unfounded.  The next logical step is to provide depositors
with more contextual information about each formal action in an easy-to-understandDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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format.  Then, should no runs occur, the debate could move on to the issue of CAMELS
disclosure.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 1: Enforcement Actions Imposed by the Federal Reserve, 1990 – 1997
This table presents data on enforcement actions imposed by (or with the blessing of) the Federal Reserve
System.  Non-publicly disclosed actions include informal supervisory actions, such as Board Resolutions,
Commitments, and Memoranda of Understanding, as well as non-final formal actions, such as Temporary
Cease-and-Desist Orders and Orders of Investigation.  The category "Other Non-Publicly Disclosed
Actions" includes other informal actions initiated by Federal and state regulatory agencies to address
supervisory concerns, including formal actions implemented by state agencies that are not enforceable
under Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.  Publicly disclosed actions include all final formal
enforcement actions.  The subset of publicly disclosed actions also includes Prohibition-and-Removal
Orders.  However, such actions are issued exclusively against institution-affiliated parties, which are not
included in this study.
Non-Publicly Disclosed Actions
Action 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Board Resolutions 90 129 123 130 79 67 60 26
C o m m i t m e n t s 10001014
Memoranda of Understanding 69 84 113 60 38 27 11 9
T e m p o r a r y  C e a s e - a n d - D e s i s t  O r d e r s 12000100
O r d e r s  o f  I n v e s t i g a t i o n 00000140
O t h e r  N o n - P u b l i c l y  D i s c l o s e d  A c t i o n s 4 4 5 9 5 2 3 4 1 4660
     Total Non-Public Enforcement Actions 205 274 288 224 132 102 82 39
Publicly Disclosed Actions
Action 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
C e a s e - a n d - D e s i s t  o r d e r s 8 1 7 2 0 1 1 1 0011
C i v i l  M o n e y  P e n a l t i e s 22522000
P r o m p t  C o r r e c t i v e  A c t i o n s 00021010
Written Agreements 27 44 51 26 9 13 8 2
     Total Public Enforcement Actions 37 63 76 41 22 13 10 3
          Total Enforcement Actions 242 337 364 265 154 115 92 42
          State Member Banks in the U.S. 991 957 942 955 961 1,028 1,001 977
Source: National Information Center DatabaseDo Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 2: Description of the Sample
This table presents data on the sample banks and the formal actions imposed on the sample banks.
Although the sample was not constructed to be representative, it matched the universe of U.S. banks and
Federal Reserve enforcement actions reasonably well. The sample actions, like most of the enforcement
actions in the 1990s, were concentrated in the first part of the decade; 81 of the 87 actions were imposed
before 1995 (see Panel A).  The sample banks, like most U.S. banks, were small—65 of the 87 actions were
imposed on banks with less than $250 million in assets (see Panel B).  The subject banks were
geographically dispersed, representing 25 states and each of the nine U.S. census regions except the Pacific
Northwest  (see Panel C). Finally, like most formal actions in the 1990s, most of the sample actions were
written agreements (60), but a nontrivial number were cease-and-desist orders (see Panel D).
Panel A: Number of Banks (Enforcement Actions) by Year









Panel B: Size of the Banks Subject to the Sample Enforcement Actions
(Total deposits as of the week prior to the announcement)
Range of Deposits
(millions of dollars) Number of Banks
$0 to $25 0
$25 to $50 9
$50 to $75 20
$75 to $100 10
$100 to $250 26
$250 to $500 7
$500 to $1,000 7
$1,000 to $2,000 4
$2,000 to $5,000 4
Over $5,000 0Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Panel C: Location of the Banks subject to the Sample Enforcement Actions





























































Panel D: Types of Formal Actions Imposed on the  Sample Banks
Type of Formal Action Number of Banks
Percentage of
Sample
Written Agreements 60 69%
Cease-and-desist orders 27 31%Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 3: Separation of Downgrades to “Problem” Status from the Imposition of
Enforcement Actions
This table shows the time interval between downgrades to problem status—defined as a CAMEL 3, 4 or 5
composite rating—and the imposition of formal actions on the sample banks.  When a bank slips to
problem status, supervisors typically require management to develop an explicit plan for restoring safety
and soundness.  These plans often involve taking steps to strengthen the bank’s leverage ratio.  Because
troubled institutions find it difficult to attract new capital, strengthening the leverage ratio typically means
reducing assets and deposits.  If supervisors simultaneously imposed an enforcement action on a sample
bank and downgraded it to problem status, then any observed change in deposits in the following weeks
might be the result of management action rather than depositor reaction.  For most of the sample banks,




Number of Banks as a
Percentage of Total
Sample
90 days or more 80 92%
180 days or more 75 86%
365 days or more 57 66%Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 4: Publicly Available Information about the Condition of the Sample Banks
Prior to the Announcement of the Enforcement Actions
This table displays measures of capital strength, profitability and asset quality for the sample banks that
were publicly available in the quarter just prior to the enforcement actions.  Most of the sample banks were
adequately capitalized: about two-thirds boasted equity-to-asset ratios above 6 percent.  Although the
sample banks posted relatively low profitability ratios—only 16 met the industry benchmark of a one-
percent return on assets—net income was positive at 47 of the banks.  Asset quality was a problem at many
of the banks; nevertheless, 51 of the 89 banks reported nonperforming-loan-to-asset ratios below the critical
4 percent threshold.  In short, although the sample banks were not, on average, in robust condition, they
were not on the verge of failure either.
Panel A: Capital Strength
Equity as percentage of total
assets
Number of banks in sample
 (87 total)
Number of Banks as a
Percentage of Total Sample
Above 10% 5 5.7%
8 to 10 12 13.8%
7 to 8 20 23.0%
6 to 7 23 26.4%
5 to 6 9 10.3%
4 to 5 12 13.8%
2 to 4 5 5.7%
Below 2 1 1.1%
Panel B: Earnings
Net income as percentage of
total assets
Number of banks in sample
(87 total)
Number of Banks as a
Percentage of Total Sample
Over 1% 16 18.4%
0.5% to 1 13 14.9%
0.0 to 0.5 18 20.7%
Negative 40 46.0%
Panel C: Asset Quality
Nonperforming loans as
percentage of total assets
Number of banks in sample
(87 total)
Number of Banks as a
Percentage of Total Sample
Less than 1% 13 14.9%
1 to 2 17 19.5%
2 to 3 13 14.9%
3 to 4 9 10.3%
4 to 5 11 12.6%
5 to 6 9 10.3%
6 to 7 78 . 0 %
Over 7 89 . 2 %
Note: A loan is classified as “nonperforming” if it is 90 days or more past due or in nonaccrual status.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 5: Evidence about Bank Runs from Four-Week Changes in Deposit Growth
This table contains evidence about bank runs from the four-week interval following the actions.  Panel A
displays the adjusted growth figures for the sample banks using the original peer group to control for
seasonal and geographic factors.  Panel B shows the adjusted growth figures when the alternative peer
group was used as a control.  Panel C documents the adjusted growth rates for the sample banks following
the last CAMEL downgrade, thereby providing a benchmark for interpreting the economic significance of
adjusted growth rates in Panels A and B.  In each panel, column 3 contains the overall change in deposit
growth (change at the sample banks minus change at the peer banks), column 4 contains the standard
deviation of the overall change, column 5 notes the statistical significance of the overall change, and
column 6 indicates what percentage of the sample banks experienced deposit runoffs relative to their peers.
Overall, the lack of large, statistically significant declines in adjusted deposits suggests that the
announcements did not spark runs on the sample banks.
Panel A: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total 0.42% -0.07% 0.49% 4.49% 45.98%
Transactions -0.24% -1.97% 1.73% 11.44% 42.53%
Savings 0.29% 0.58% -0.29% 8.84% 50.57%
Small Time 0.84% 0.01% 0.83% 3.80% ** 48.28%
Large Time -1.74% 1.14% -2.88% 18.67% 57.47%
Panel B: Sample Banks vs. Alternative Peer Group




























Total 0.42% -0.02% 0.43% 3.87% 43.68%
Transactions -0.24% -0.32% 0.08% 8.53% 49.43%
Savings 0.29% -0.08% 0.38% 8.33% 43.68%
Small Time 0.84% 0.08% 0.76% 3.62% * 47.13%
Large Time -1.74% 0.74% -2.48% 19.50% 50.57%
Panel C: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total -0.48% 0.09% -0.56% 4.85% 53.62%
Transactions 0.87% -0.30% 1.17% 15.09% 46.38%
Savings -2.35% 0.22% -2.57% 15.07% 57.97%
Small Time 0.09% -0.01% 0.10% 6.65% 43.48%
Large Time -2.56% 0.27% -2.83% 14.82% 55.07%
Note:
*** = significant at the 1% level.
  ** = significant at the 5% level.
    * = significant at the 10% level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 6: Evidence about Market Discipline from One-Quarter Changes in Deposit
Growth
This table contains evidence about depositor discipline from the one-quarter interval following the actions.
Panel A displays the adjusted growth figures for the sample banks using the original peer group to control
for seasonal and geographic factors.  Panel B shows the adjusted growth figures when the alternative peer
group was used as a control.  Panel C documents the adjusted growth rates for the sample banks following
the last CAMEL downgrade, thereby providing a benchmark for interpreting the economic significance of
growth rates in Panels A and B.  In each panel, column 3 contains the overall change in deposit growth
(change at the sample banks minus change at the peer banks), column 4 contains the standard deviation of
the overall change, column 5 notes the statistical significance of the overall change, and column 6 indicates
what percentage of the sample banks experienced deposit runoffs relative to their peers.  Overall, the lack
of large, statistically significant declines in adjusted deposits suggests that the announcements did not
provoke depositor discipline.
Panel A: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total 0.46% -0.05% 0.51% 6.80% 52.87%
Transactions -2.34% -1.60% -0.74% 15.09% 50.57%
Savings 0.68% 0.47% 0.22% 16.47% 52.87%
Small Time 1.55% 0.17% 1.38% 9.16% 45.98%
Large Time 0.92% 2.94% -2.02% 27.95% 45.98%
Panel B: Sample Banks vs. Alternative Peer Group




























Total 0.46% 0.28% 0.18% 6.10% 51.72%
Transactions -2.34% 0.26% -2.60% 13.09% * 55.17%
Savings 0.68% 0.37% 0.32% 15.66% 54.02%
Small Time 1.55% 0.49% 1.06% 8.26% 45.98%
Large Time 0.92% -0.20% 1.12% 29.33% 44.83%
Panel C: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total -1.05% 0.44% -1.49% 13.71% 63.77%
Transactions 0.80% 0.96% -0.15% 16.70% 50.72%
Savings -3.03% 1.55% -4.58% 19.41% * 60.87%
Small Time 4.73% -0.64% 5.36% 33.58% 53.62%
Large Time -6.87% 0.12% -6.99% 27.61% ** 55.07%
Note:
*** = significant at the 1% level.
  ** = significant at the 5% level.
    * = significant at the 10% level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 7: Evidence about Market Discipline from Two-Quarter Changes in Deposit
Growth
This table contains evidence about depositor discipline from the two-quarter interval following the actions.
Panel A displays the adjusted growth figures for the sample banks using the original peer group to control
for seasonal and geographic factors.  Panel B shows the adjusted growth figures when the alternative peer
group was used as a control.  Panel C documents the adjusted growth rates for the sample banks following
the last CAMEL downgrade, thereby providing a benchmark for interpreting the economic significance of
growth rates in Panels A and B.  In each panel, column 3 contains the overall change in deposit growth
(change at the sample banks minus change at the peer banks), column 4 contains the standard deviation of
the overall change, column 5 notes the statistical significance of the overall change, and column 6 indicates
what percentage of the sample banks experienced deposit runoffs relative to their peers.  Overall, the lack
of large, statistically significant, declines in adjusted deposits suggests that the announcements did not
provoke depositor discipline.
Panel A: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total 0.15% 0.25% -0.10% 14.62% 50.57%
Transactions -3.81% -0.54% -3.27% 22.53% 50.57%
Savings -3.07% 0.57% -3.64% 24.50% 52.87%
Small Time 2.17% 0.73% 1.43% 20.91% 54.02%
Large Time -1.04% 5.48% -6.52% 42.79% 55.17%
Panel B: Sample Banks vs. Alternative Peer Group




























Total 0.15% 0.47% -0.33% 13.88% 57.47%
Transactions -3.81% 0.31% -4.13% 19.89% * 54.02%
Savings -3.07% 0.48% -3.55% 23.25% 59.77%
Small Time 2.17% 0.60% 1.57% 19.00% 52.87%
Large Time -1.04% 0.57% -1.61% 38.84% 52.87%
Panel C: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group




























Total -3.59% -0.07% -3.52% 16.13% * 66.67%
Transactions -1.74% 1.83% -3.57% 22.44% 50.72%
Savings -4.16% 1.27% -5.43% 26.44% * 56.52%
Small Time 4.23% -2.21% 6.44% 32.29% 52.17%
Large Time -13.60% -0.73% -12.87% 38.47% *** 60.87%
Note:
*** = significant at the 1% level.
  ** = significant at the 5% level.
    * = significant at the 10% level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 8: Evidence about Market Discipline from One-Quarter Changes in Deposit
Spreads
This table contains evidence from deposit spreads about depositor discipline in the one-quarter interval
following the actions.  Panel A displays the changes in the trends in adjusted spreads using the original peer
group to control for seasonal, geographic, and macroeconomic factors.  Panel B shows the changes in the
trends in adjusted spreads using the alternative peer group.  Panel C documents changes in the adjusted
spreads for the sample banks following the last CAMEL downgrade, thereby providing a benchmark for
interpreting the economic significance of changes in spreads in Panels A and B.  In each panel, column 3
contains the overall change in deposit spreads (change at the sample banks minus change at the peer
banks), column 4 contains the standard deviation of the overall change, column 5 notes the statistical
significance of the overall change, and column 6 indicates what percentage of the sample banks saw their
adjusted spreads widen relative to their peers.  Overall, the absence of a large, statistically significant
widening in adjusted spreads suggests that the announcements did not provoke depositor discipline.
Panel A: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group



























Gross 0.00% 0.02% -0.01% 0.71% 51%
Net 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.71% 46%
Transactions 0.09% 0.02% 0.07% 0.92% 49%
Savings 0.00% -0.01% 0.01% 0.83% 48%
Small Time 0.16% -0.03% 0.19% 1.67% 57%
Large Time -0.20% 0.06% -0.27% 2.16% 46%
Panel B: Sample Banks vs. Alternative Peer Group



























Gross 0.00% 0.01% -0.01% 0.65% 40%
Net 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.62% 38%
Transactions 0.09% 0.00% 0.10% 0.88% 49%
Savings 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.77% 49%
Small Time 0.16% 0.02% 0.14% 1.64% 44%
Large Time -0.20% 0.00% -0.21% 1.89% 37%
Panel C: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group



























Gross 0.33% -0.05% 0.37% 2.21% 56%
Net 0.33% -0.03% 0.36% 2.22% 58%
Transactions 0.22% -0.11% 0.32% 1.63% * 53%
Savings 0.33% -0.11% 0.45% 2.39% 57%
Small Time 0.42% -0.09% 0.54% 2.13% ** 57%
Large Time 0.31% -0.28% 0.62% 3.28% 53%
Note:
*** = significant at the 1% level.
  ** = significant at the 5% level.
    * = significant at the 10% level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Table 9: Evidence about Market Discipline from Two-Quarter Changes in Deposit
Spreads
This table contains evidence from deposit spreads about depositor discipline in the two-quarter interval
following the actions.  Panel A displays the changes in the trends in adjusted spreads using the original peer
group to control for seasonal, geographic, and macroeconomic factors.  Panel B shows the changes in the
trends in adjusted spreads using the alternative peer group.  Panel C documents changes in the adjusted
spreads for the sample banks following the last CAMEL downgrade, thereby providing a benchmark for
interpreting the economic significance of changes in spreads in Panels A and B.  In each panel, column 3
contains the overall change in deposit spreads (change at the sample banks minus change at the peer
banks), column 4 contains the standard deviation of the overall change, column 5 notes the statistical
significance of the overall change, and column 6 indicates what percentage of the sample banks saw their
adjusted spreads widen relative to their peers.  Overall, the absence of a large, statistically significant,
widening in adjusted spreads suggests that the announcements did not provoke depositor discipline.
Panel A: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group



























Gross -0.08% 0.15% -0.23% 1.11% * 37%
Net -0.09% 0.17% -0.26% 1.04% ** 34%
Transactions -0.03% 0.10% -0.13% 0.98% 40%
Savings -0.11% 0.06% -0.17% 1.25% 43%
Small Time -0.03% 0.13% -0.16% 1.14% 47%
Large Time -0.10% 0.31% -0.40% 1.88% ** 38%
Panel B: Sample Banks vs. Alternative Peer Group



























Gross -0.08% 0.06% -0.14% 0.99% 34%
Net -0.09% 0.08% -0.16% 0.99% 31%
Transactions -0.03% 0.02% -0.05% 0.86% 40%
Savings -0.11% 0.03% -0.14% 1.16% 37%
Small Time -0.03% 0.06% -0.10% 0.95% 40%
Large Time -0.10% 0.09% -0.18% 1.23% 37%
Panel C: Sample Banks vs. Original Peer Group



























Gross 0.15% -0.14% 0.28% 1.91% 56%
Net 0.17% -0.13% 0.30% 1.90% 58%
Transactions 0.67% -0.24% 0.91% 4.81% 55%
Savings 0.11% -0.19% 0.30% 1.96% 55%
Small Time 0.18% -0.19% 0.40% 1.68% ** 56%
Large Time 0.20% -0.04% 0.28% 2.54% 52%
Note:
*** = significant at the 1% level.
  ** = significant at the 5% level.
    * = significant at the 10% level.Do Depositors Care about Enforcement Actions?
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Figure 1: Combinations of Changes in Deposit Growth and Deposit Spreads in the
Two-Quarter Interval following the Announcements
This figure provides a visual summary of our results.  It shows ordered pairs of changes in deposit growth
and deposit spreads for each sample bank in the two-quarter interval following the announcements.
Depositor discipline involves a relative decrease in the supply of deposits to the sample banks.  Such a
decrease would engender a decline in adjusted deposit growth and a widening of adjusted deposit spreads.
In the figure, a cluster of points in quadrant II would be consistent with depositor discipline.  Note that the
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